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BIOGRAPHY BEHIND THE SCENES:
BENJAMIN VICTOR COHEN AND THE
SPIRIT OF THE NEW DEAL

William Lasser
Clemson University
Benjamin Victor Cohen was one of the most important and
influential figures in American politics in the 1930s and 1940s.
Working always behind the scenes, he played a major role in
shaping America's response to the Great Depression of the 1930s
and to the growing global crisis that led, eventually, to U.S.
involvement in the second World War. Though his official titles
were inconsequential, Cohen quickly emerged as a key adviser to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, taking responsibility over a wide
range of domestic and foreign policy matters.
It is impossible to assess Cohen's role in New Deal
Washington except in the context of his relationship with Thomas
Gardiner Corcoran, who served in a similar capacity in the first
years of the Roosevelt administration. For several years, Cohen
and "Tommy the Cork" were linked in an unusual partnership,
working closely together to write legislation, lobby Congress, and
generally serve as go-betweens in the growingly complex bureaucratic structure of the federal government. Their role in the New
Deal era is best summed up by their popular nickname-"The
Gold Dust Twins"-after a 1930s soap advertisement that urged
American housewives to "let the Gold Dust Twins do your work."
Though I am writing Cohen's biography, Corcoran figures heavily in the New Deal chapters. Furthermore, Cohen and
Corcoran remained life-long friends, and their relationship remains one of the central issues in the book. Their relationship is
important in another way, too: for the political scientist, Cohen
and Corcoran's life and work provides an extraordinary vehicle to
view American and global politics in the 1930s and 1940s. For
while Cohen and Corcoran were by no means at the top of the
Washington power structure, they were very definitely at its
center. Close to such key figures as FDR himself, Supreme Court
Justices Felix Franfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis
Brandeis, and congressional leaders like House Majority Leader
(and later Speaker) Sam Rayburn andJamesF. Byrnes, Cohen and
Corcoran were involved, directly or indirectly, in an extraordinary
number of the key events and decisions of the Roosevelt era. They
thus allow the political biographer to analyze afresh the events of
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this critical period in U.S. and world history, and provide new
insight into the political philosophy and working style of the first
modern administration in American history. Because the Roosevelt administration was so influential in shaping the modern
American political system and in helping to create the post-war
world political order , a study of the lives and work of Cohen and
Corcoran tells us a great deal about the world in which we
ourselves live.
Such a biography, however, presents a variety of difficulties and challenges. Some of these, of course, are the same as those
which face any biographer. Others are unique. In this paper I want
to focus on the literary and scholarly challenges presented by a
biography of men whose influence, while obviously great, was
frequently exercised in secret; whose activities were frequently
undertaken anonymously or under other people's names; whose
"paper trails" are minimal, misleading, or both; and whose exploits and contributions are unknown even to many historians of
the period. Most of all, I wish to highlight some of the benefits
and some of the dangers inherent in writing a biography of men
who worked for-but who were not themselves-major political
figures .

I
Ben Cohen and Tommy Corcoran first worked together in 1933,
when Cohen was brought to Washington by Felix Frankfurter to
work on the Securities Act of 1933. Although nearly four years
had passed since the collapse of the stock market in October 1929,
there was still no significant federal regulation of the securities
industry when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in March 1933.
The new president quickly made stock market reform a priority.
As a first step, he and his advisers proposed a measure , modeled
on the British Companies Act, that required those who offered
securities for sale to disclose a variety of information to prospective buyers.
Unfortunately, the first efforts at producing an effective
"truth in securities" bill were an utter failure, and by April 1933
Roosevelt needed help . Frankfurter brought Cohen and Corcoran
together with James Landis-who would become the first chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission-and charged them
with producing a viable and effective securities bill. The CohenCorcoran-Landis draft eventually became the Securities Act of
1933, and marked the beginning of the Cohen-Corcoran partnership.
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Cohen, at the time, was nearly 40. The son of Jewish
immigrants from Poland and Lithuania, Cohen attended the
University of Chicago, graduating with honors at the age of 19with, it was said, the highest grades the University had ever
recorded. By 21 he had earned his law degree and had moved on
to do graduate work with Frankfurter at the Harvard Law School;
before the age of 30, he had served as a lawyer for the U.S.
Shipping Board, as an adviser to Julian Mack and the American
Zionists at the Versailles Peace Talks, and as counsel to the
American Zionist office in London. Among other things, he
helped to write the Palestine Mandate. 1
In the early 1920s, Cohen returned to the United States,
setting up in the private practice of law on Wall Street. He became
an active investor in the wild days of the 1920s, amassing what
even today would be considered a solid fortune in stocks (he was
said to be the largest single shareholder in the Chrysler Corporation).2 By the late 1920s most if not all of his income came from
investments-he even listed his occupation for tax purposes as
"lawyer and investor. "3 While in New York, Cohen found time to
assist in the preparation of progressive legislation in the state
capital of Albany, and continued to assist the Zionist movement
in Palestine, focusing on economic development questions. When
Frankfurter needed help in drafting the Securities Act, therefore,
Cohen was an obvious choice: a brilliant legal mind with a gift for
writing legislation and an impressive background in high finance.
Corcoran, by contrast, was a relative newcomer. Born in
1900 to a politically active Irish-American family in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island, Corcoran graduated at the top of his class at Brown
University and then at Harvard Law School. There, he too met
Frankfurter, who persuaded him to take an extra year of legal
education in preparation for a career in law education. 4 The
following year-1926- 7-Corcoran was selected by Frankfurter
to go to Washington to serve as law clerk to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes . All of this, while exciting and interesting, kept Corcoran
away from his professed goal-which was, as he put it, to go to
Wall Street and make a million dollars. 5 He accomplished the first
part of that quest in 1927, when he joined the influential Wall
Street firm of Cotton, Franklin. The second part proved more
difficult, however; Corcoran arrived on Wall Street too late to
really benefit from the run-up of stocks in the 1920s, and just in
time to be hit by the October 1929 crash. For the next two years,
he suffered through Wall Street's depression, doing the work of
two or three men and making, at least in relative terms, next to
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nothing. When the opportunity came to go back to Washington in
1931, Corcoran jumped at it. That opportunity came in the form
of an appointment to the staff of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, a bipartisan agency set up under President Herbert
Hoover to provide capital for the reorganization of banks and
other large corporations hit hard by the growing Depression.
When Roosevelt came to power in March 1933, Corcoran
was so disappointed with the new president's inaugural address
that he almost went back to New York; Holmes persuaded him to
stay, and then Frankfurter tapped him to work with Cohen and
Landis on the Securities bill.
Cohen and Corcoran became friends almost instantly, and
their relationship was, for both men, unique. Cohen was a loner;
a quiet, reserved, and retiring man. His kind and gentle manner,
his unpretentiousness, and his generosity made him beloved by
many, but he was close to very few. Corcoran, by contrast, was
robust and gregarious. He made friends easily, and fit comfortably with men and women from every stratum of New Deal society.
He could entertain the president with Irish ballads; drink whiskey
with the Texas congressional delegation; charm the Washington
secretaries (one of whom he married); and hold his own with Wall
Street executives or local political bosses. His aggressiveness and
brashness caused him to make as many enemies as friends,
however, and ultimately caused him to break with several of the
few real friends he had. Only with Ben Cohen was his friendship
constant from the early 1930s until the end of their lives.
Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis began work on the securities
bill on April 7, 1933. A first draft was prepared by April 10; a
second draft, produced in response to various objections made by
the House Interstate Commerce Committee, emerged by April
21. 6 By that time it was already clear that Cohen and Corcoran
were getting on famously but that Landis and Cohen had difficulty
working together. 7 Nevertheless, the threesome produced a draft
bill that substantially modified the administration's original proposal. Like the British Companies Act, the Cohen-CorcoranLandis draft required registration of all new securities and full
disclosure of a variety of financial details. Unlike the original
administration proposal, however, the new bill was specifically
adapted to the rapidly evolving complexity of modem finance,
and ensured for flexible administration by granting the Federal
Trade Commission a wide variety of discretionary powers. Cohen's
major contribution was to couple this administrative flexibility
with a detailed schedule of disclosure requirements written directly into the statute itself. This combination of statutory
specificity and administrative discretion remains a model statute.
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The bill, moreover, closed a major loophole by extending the
reach of the measure not only to the primary issuers of securities
but also to underwriters, lawyers, accountants, appraisers, and
others involved in the securities industry. 8 Despite the objections
of the business community, the Cohen-Corcoran-Landis bill
passed the House and survived essentially intact through a conference with the Senate . It became law on May 27, 1933.
Cohen and Corcoran played major roles in the other two
major pieces of New Deal securities legislation: the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act of 1935. Their draft of the Securities Exchange Act, largely
written by Cohen, would have fundamentally restructured American finance. The draft mandated that
(1) credit for exchange trading should be severely restricted; (2) the activities of individual exchange members should be clearly defined and circumscribed in order to make precise the relationship between members and
clients and in order to force the exchanges to
fulfill their primary obligation as a public
marketplace; (3) trading by directors, officers,
and principle stockholders of listed corporations should be subject to public scrutiny and
legal redress; (4) the financial affairs of listed
corporations should be a matter of public record.

Cohen, moreover, would have given the Federal Trade Commission "almost plenary power" to regulate the stock exchanges. 9
The bill almost perfectly reflects the philosophical underpinnings
of the New Deal: it dealt strictly, even harshly, with the abuses of
capitalism as practiced on Wall Street, but it did so not to destroy
Wall Street, but to save it. It was a liberal, reformist bill, but it was
written by a successful Wall Street insider.
Cohen's draft was brilliantly crafted, but it suffered from
a variety of political faults. First, Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis
had produced a draft bill without a clear mandate from or the
specific support of President Roosevelt. Their original commission to write the bill came informally, from Max Lowenthal and
Ferdinand Pecora, who had close connections to Senator Duncan
Fletcher (D-Fla.). The threesome had only "a display of interest"
from White House aide Rexford Tugwell to indicate White House
support. They were given no clear policy guidance from either
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Congress or the president. Moreover, they had distributed their
draft within only a narrow circle centered around Sen. Fletcher
and Rep. Sam Rayburn, and had failed even to anticipate-much
less to assuage-the concerns of the business community. When
President Roosevelt called for securities legislation in February
1934, Fletcher and Rayburn had the Cohen-Corcoran-Landis bill
at the ready, and introduced it immediately. But the president's
battle cry was vague and did not specifically endorse the approach
of the Cohen-Corcoran-Landis bill. 10
Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis were blindsided by the
extent of the business community's opposition to their bill, and by
the speed and skill with which that opposition was marshalled.
Richard Whitney, the president of the New York Stock Exchange,
came to Washington to direct the opposition to the bill personally,
occupying an entire floor of the Willard Hotel with his troops. 11
Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis also found themselves caught
between warring factions within the administration, including the
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
Department of Commerce.
The ensuing battle brought Cohen and Corcoran into the
public spotlight for the first time, battling a well-organized and
determined foe. Their reaction to this challenge gave them their
first experience in learning to play the Washington power game.
When Corcoran went to testify in defense of the bill, he found that
his opponents had outmaneuvered him: to his surprise, the committee hearing was public, not private; and the business lobby had
arranged for their own lawyer to sit beside the committee and
cross-examine the witness! Corcoran's natural talents and the
force of his personality got him through the crisis, however; he
reacted to this trying situation, as the historian Arthur Schlesinger
put it, with "limitless aplomb," relishing the give-and-take like an
aroused streetfighter. 1
For the first time, Cohen and Corcoran had to learn to
master the political process. They learned to size up the political
realities and balance them against their own policy preferences.
They engaged in secret negotiations and compromise with business leaders, executive officials, and congressional power brokers. They learned to play the House off against the Senate. 13
When they could not achieve what had seemed to them the key
element of their ~:!l namely keeping the Federal Trade Commission in control of the administration of the statute-they
accepted reality and moved forward to ensure that the alternative-the newly created Securities Exchange Commission-would
not be "captured" by Wall Street interests.
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Above all, perhaps, Cohen and Corcoran discovered that
one role the subordinate could play on behalf of his politically
more visible superiors was the very simple one of taking the heat.
Corcoran and Cohen were subjected to a wide variety of denunciations on the floor of Congress, even charged with being
communistic and anti-capitalist (that they lived with other New
Dealers in a Georgetown residence known as "The Little Red
House on R Street" did not help matters). Corcoran later wrote
Frankfurter that "Ray Maley, Pecora, Sam Rayburn, and [Vice
President John Nance] Garner have been magnificent ....
Otherwise we kids would have taken the beating alone. " 14 In fact,
though, it was Corcoran and Cohen who performed the service to
their superiors and not the other way around.
A similar lesson was to be learned the following year in the
fight over the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. Cohen, who
had been appointed counsel to the National Power Policy Committee, wrote the first draft of the bill at the request of Federal
Trade Commissioner Robert Healy. Though he knew that Roosevelt believed holding companies "should be abolished," Cohen
proceeded nonetheless to write a bill that did "not outlaw the
holding company but regulates and restricts the use of the holding
company form and provides a mechanism through which, over a
period of time, existing holding company structures may be
simplified, and their field limited to a sphere which their economic
advantages may be demonstrable. " 15 Perhaps influenced by his
experience with the Securities Exchange Act, Cohen had forged
a bill that would essentially achieve the president's objectives but
which would be far more politically attractive than any attempt to
destroy the holding companies outright. For one thing, he wanted
to ensure that "Congress feels that the particular bill is their bill
and not the bill of the executive." 16 Roosevelt insisted, however,
and Cohen redrafted the bill to include the so-called "death
sentence" provision giving the SEC the authority to dissolve
utility holding companies outright after January 1, 1940.
The ensuing fight over the Holding Companies Act was
messy and vicious, and Cohen and Corcoran were at the center of
it. The Utilities Companies carried out an extraordinary lobbying
effort, enlisting powerful allies, especially in the House. Political
considerations, of course, were also a factor. In the end the fight
boiled down to the "death sentence" provision; the Senate adopted
it, the House did not. The provision was eventually defeated in
conference, and the president signed the amended bill.
Throughout the process Roosevelt let Cohen and Corcoran take the blame for the death penalty provision, which was
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added originally at his own insistence. And blamed they were. As
Cohen described it later,
The atmosphere was super-charged with
charges that the Congressmen were being used
as rubber stamps ... that no one knew or
understood anything about the bill but a couple
of young men-hot heads-with no political
or practical experience. Every effort ... was
put forth to sow the seeds of suspicion and
distrust between the Senate and House. Tales
were carried back and forth to make the leaders of each committee feel that the leader of the
other was trying to double-cross him, every
petty jealousy was played upon. 17
One Republican Senator, Ralph Owen Brewster of Maine, had
indicated his support of the administration bill to Corcoran, then
turned around and denied he had ever offered such support.
Moreover, he charged that Corcoran had threatened that if Brewster
did not support FDR on the death sentence provision, the president
"would find it necessary to stop construction on the Passamaquoddy Dam in my district." Brewster's charge touched off a
formal congressional investigation, which fully vindicated Corcoran but which, in the meantime, played into the hands of the bill's
opponents.
The Public Utilities Holding Company Act was subsequently challenged in the federal courts, with Ben Cohen in charge
of the government's defense. The utilities companies engineered
their own test case before a sympathetic judge in Baltimore, MD,
which took the form of a suit brought by a creditor against a
bankrupt holding company. Thus the government was reduced to
the minor role of appearing as an amicus curiae. Cohen, however,
devised a counter-strategy: he simply refused to contest the
Baltimore suit, allowing his opponents to win the battle but
effectively postponing the war. Cohen continued to refuse to
contest similar suits until he found his own test case . Then he
argued it brilliantly, and won. 18
The battles over the securities acts and the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act clearly illustrate Cohen and Corcoran's
role in the Roosevelt administration. Though they held no
important formal offices, and no specified duties, they fulfilled a
key function in a period of rapid expansion of the federal
government's size, complexity, and functions: they provided a
vital link between the legislative, executive, and judicial depart125

ments, and provided a measure of coordination and control
between the executive departments. At a time when there were
few formal mechanisms for bridging the gaps created by the
American constitutional system of the separation of powers,
Cohen and Corcoran provided an informal one. At times they
functioned as congressional committee staff; at other times, as
White House staff. When necessary, they could carry messages
from the justices of the Supreme Court to Roosevelt, or from the
president to key congressmen. They provided liaison between,
for example, the Justice Department and the power agencies in
order to coordinate strategy over the handling of the Public
Utilities cases.
It is often asked how the American system of government,
designed in an age when the functions of the federal government
at home and abroad were sharply limited, manages to function in
the twentieth century as well as it does. Since the great expansion
of federal power in the 1930s and 1940s, a variety of functional
relationships between the various power centers in Washington
have evolved and multiplied. In the early stages of the expansion,
however, the ability of the government to manage its increasing
responsibilities was greatly enhanced by the kind of informal
networking and power brokering practiced by Cohen and Corcoran. In many ways, in fact, the more formalized system of today
evolved directly from the Cohen and Corcoran model.
The three securities laws which they helped write were in
a very real sense Cohen and Corcoran' s baptism under fire in the
political arena. By 1936 they had established themselves as
fixtures in New Deal Washington. They had proved their talents
as draftsmen and as lobbyists, and had proven their loyalty to
Roosevelt, Frankfurter, and key congressional leaders. They
were playing an increasingly important role as Roosevelt's
speech writers, as his eyes and ears in the political field, and as his
personal operatives.
They had also learned some important lessons. The
Securities Exchange Act taught them that they could not be
successful if they merely served as technical advisers on specific
issues and left it to others to guage the political winds and adjust
accordingly. The securities fights also taught them the essential
vulnerability inherent in their positions as unofficial staff aides:
they could be used and manipulated by their friends-meaning
their political superiors-who might employ them as decoys or
bargaining chips or enlist them for unsavory tasks (as when FDR
had them carry the brunt of the "death penalty"); and they could
become the front men for attack by their enemies, who found them
easier and more vulnerable targets than the men they worked for.
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In both cases they provided an invaluable service; but how could
they protect themselves in the process?

n
By far the most effective way Cohen and Corcoran learned to
protect themselves was to develop what has come to be known as
a "passion for anonymity." When the Brownlow Commission (set
up by FDR in 1936 to study ways of addressing the president's
increasingly obvious need for formal staff support) used that
phrase to describe the kind of mind-set necessary for a presidential
adviser, they more than likely had Cohen and Corcoran in mind.
For Cohen and Corcoran soon discovered that they could be most
effective in pursuing both their own agenda and the president's by
staying as much as possible outside the public eye. Keeping a low
profile reduced their vulnerability to attack from the opposition,
and, in the long run, made them more useful to their superiors as
well.
It is commonly assumed that the "passion for anonymity"
is a sort of character trait, and indeed many New Dealers assumed
that Cohen especially relished the background role to which he
had grown accustomed. Frustrated with not being taken seriously
by the State Department, for example, Cohen asked in January
1945 to be appointed Counselor. Roosevelt rebuffed him, however, and Cohen was so unhappy about being kept on the sidelines
that he briefly left government service altogether. 19 Cohen indeed
was quiet and unassuming, and he did turn down a federal
judgeship when it was offered to him. 20 Even so, his passion for
anonymity had its limits.
For Corcoran, however, the habit of keeping out of the
public eye was clearly an acquired trait. The ebullient and
gregarious Corcoran had to restrain himself deliberately out of
self-defense. Until around 1934, for example, he wrote long
letters to Frankfurter and others, describing his own activities and
the political scene in marvelous detail. In that year-apparently
as a result of the adverse publicity in the Securities Exchange Act
controversy-Corcoran' s letters become more and more guarded.
Eventually, it appears, he learned to enjoy operating in secrecy.
He began making sensitive phone calls from pay phones (his
phone was tapped, in fact, during the Truman administration), and
he depended more and more on personal contacts instead of
written communications. When in the 1940s he aided Army Air
Corps General Claire Chennault in forming the American Volunteer Force that fought in China prior to American involvement in
World War II, he and his partners communicated by code, and
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formed increasingly complex and arcane legal arrangements to
hide their involvement. Later in life, when Corcoran had become
an influential Washington lawyer-lobbyist, his numerousclientsincluding the United Fruit Company and the Republic of Chinalearned to appreciate his acquired passion for secrecy. The
professional necessity of guarding his client's interests combined
with the sensitive nature of much of his work to make him a kind
of shadowy figure in Washington, operating behind the scenes,
pulling strings, never showing his hand. The image of secrecy
itself became a source of political power, for, not knowing exactly
how much power he actually wielded, friends and enemies alike
tended to estimate his power on the high side.
Corcoran did not develop this passion for secrecy quickly
enough to prevent him from gaining a reputation as the
administration's hatchet man in the 1930s. In 1937 he managed
the campaign to "pack" the Supreme Court by replacing hostile
older justices with younger ones friendly to the New Deal. When
the Court-packing plan became a political debacle, Corcoran took
much of the blame. The following year, Roosevelt enlisted
Corcoran' s help in his attempt to "purge" the Democratic Party of
anti-new Deal conservatives. The purge failed also, and again
Corcoran took the fall. Corcoran's increasingly negative reputation led in part to his break with Roosevelt in the 1940s and to the
ending of his public career; he had outlived his usefulness to FDR,
and was too much of a political liability to be appointed to any
important position within the administration. Lacking money,
and feeling betrayed, Corcoran left the administration for private
life.
Cohen too fell naturally into a less public role. In 1940, he
was the principal architect of the Destroyers for Bases Agreement,
under which the United States traded old navy ships to Britain in
return for the right to use British navy bases. The arrangement
seemed to violate the Neutrality Act (the Attorney General had
ruled a few months before, in fact, that a similar arrangement
involving torpedo boats was illegal) and was, moreover, politically dangerous, especially since 1940 was a presidential election
year. Cohen devised an elaborate and ingenious legal argument
to justify the plan, however, and then orchestrated a major public
relations campaign to garner public support. His involvement in
the Destroyers deal-a measure which was critical to the British
war effort at the time and which became the precursor to the more
elaborate Lend-Lease program-was
kept so far in the background, however, that Cohen has received almost no credit in the
history books.
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Cohen and Corcoran's "passion for anonymity"-even
when artificially self-imposed-served
them well. For their
biographer, however, it is more problematical. Because they
operated in the shadows, committing less and less to paper and
doing more and more in other people's names, they left a very
minimal paper trail. The Corcoran Papers are voluminous, and
give a general idea of what he was up to.21 But they do not provide
a clear or unambiguous account of his activities on a detailed, dayto-day level. The Cohen Papers, by contrast, are extremely
limited in scope-a total of 26 boxes in the main collection, plus
scattered materials elsewhere. 22 I have at times summed up the
difficulties involved in writing such a biography by saying-with
what seems like only a little exaggeration-that
Cohen didn't
save anything, and Corcoran didn't write anything down.
Attempting to reconstruct the multifarious activities of
two such men from a limited record poses dangers of two varieties. It is possible to understate their activities, since much of what
they did is not recorded in clear and unambiguous terms. More
often, one is tempted to overstate their influence on events. For
they frequently used their lack of public exposure to give the
appearance, as I have said, that their power was greater than it
really was. Thus those who knew them, even fairly well, are not
always able accurately to assess their importance, and even
contemporary accounts often contain distortions and exaggerations. Moreover, their own recollections-especially Corcoran' sare notoriously unreliable, as they frequently adopted a deliberate
strategy of either exaggerating or downplaying their own activities to serve particular political purposes. (One example comes to
mind. Corcoran played a minor role in expediting the building of
National Airport in Washington, DC in the late 1930s-an effort
that was appreciated by the military, since the new Pentagon
building was to be built on the site of the old airstrip and
construction could not begin until after National was opened for
business. Years later, in his unpublished memoirs, Corcoran
declared, "I built that airport.")
Writing a biography of men who were always in the
background does have its advantages, however. It provides a
unique perspective on an extraordinary period in American and
world history . All too often biographies of politicians or government officials attribute to the principals ideas, policies, or programs that were, in fact, greatly influenced or even conceived and
carried out entirely by staff members. Biographers of Roosevelt,
for example, have a tendency to ignore or forget the fact that many
of his most famous speeches were written by others, including
Cohen and Corcoran. In a way, therefore, writers of more standard
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biographies face the identical problem of separating the actual
influence of their subjects from the influence of those who
surround them and work for them. It is simply easier for the
biographer of Roosevelt to ignore this problem than it is for the
biographer of Cohen or Corcoran.

III
Allow me to conclude with a brief comment on the dual biography
issue. Although my project is not technically a dual biography,
but focuses only on Cohen, in the chapters on the New Deal the
close working relationship of Cohen and Corcoran gives it a
similar flavor, and raises similar scholarly and literary issues. I
want to focus on just one.
When writing about a man who was, at least for a while,
part of a team or parmership, it is tempting at times to fall into the
habit of thinking of the two subjects as a sort of corporate entityCohen-and-Corcoran, as their friends and critics alike called them
in the 1930s. Often it is difficult, in fact, to separate the two in
terms of their individual contributions to specific projects. This
problem is especially magnified during the New Deal, for many
of the programs and policies of the New Deal were in effect group
efforts-the New Dealers lived together, worked together, and
socialized together, and ideas were traded back and forth, borrowed, and copied at a dizzying pace. It is impossible, for
example, to determine except in general terms precisely what
Cohen contributed to the Securities Act as compared to Landis of
Corcoran. Even trying to do so can result in a distorted picture of
the process by which policy was made in New Deal Washington.
There is the further danger of reacting in the opposite
direction, and viewing Cohen and Corcoran as two sides of the
same coin. It is especially tempting to do this because so many
viewed them this way in their own lifetime, and because literary
pressures may create temptations to create neat or catchy characterizations. To many, Cohen was "the saint," an unassuming,
scholarly idealist who labored selflessly to serve the public
interest; while Corcoran was an ambitious, self-interested political operator, the "public interest lawyer" who was "working
against what he had done" in the New Deal. 23 In the words of one
book on the New Deal, Cohen was the "Dreamer," Corcoran the
"Dealer. "24 Corcoran also contributed to this image problem. Late
in life, Cohen lamented that Corcoran' s enemies-of whom there
were by then many-"pretended
to take seriously his sputterings
about power as if he were only concerned with power for power's
sake rather than for the vindication of the humanistic values of life
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which he cherished and esteems beyond their ken. " 25 Cohen's
image, ironically, benefited ~y compa_rison as his pa:rner'~ suffered, until he, too, became akmd of cancatured, two-d1mens1onal
figure.
My challenge-as for any biographer-is to capture in
print the complex, often contradictory reality that Ben Cohen and
his contemporaries represented in real life, and to use this carefully drawn portrait to provide fresh insight into the exrraordinary
times in which they lived and which they helped to shape.
NOTES
A variety of materials dealing with Cohen's Zionist activities can
be found at the Zionist Archives in New York City. On the Zionist
movement generally, see Melvin I. Urofsky, American Zionism
From Herzl to the Holocaust (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press,
1975).
2 In 1934, the brokerage firm of S hearson, Hammill & Co. reported
to Cohen that it was holding in his account securities valued at
over $167,000, a figure that approximates $1,000,000 in current
dollars. The Shearson account may or may not have held his
complete portfolio, and, of course, the value of Cohen's stocks
and bonds had dropped sharply after the 1929 crash.
3 "Individual Income Tax Return for Benjamin Victor Cohen,"
1929, Cohen Papers, Box 21, Library of Congress. Cohen listed
$13.92 in bank interest; $24,493.39 in profits from the sale of
stocks; $34,312.50 in dividends, for a total gross income of
$58,819.81. His income from salaries, wages, commissions, and
from "Business or Profession" was exactly zero.
4
During that year, Corcoran and Frankfurter published "Petty
Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury," Harvard La.wReview 39 (June 1926), pp. 917-1019.
5
Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A New Look at the New
Deal (New York: Doubleday, 1988), pp. 62-4.
6
Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 64. On the
Securities Act of 1933, see generally pp. 42- 72.
7
Corcoran, years later, wrote that "Ben and Jim, both brilliant
men, were equally highstrung. They would work each other into
emotional frenzies over such esoteric differences oflegal opinion
that I could grasp the issues just well enough to arbitrate between
them." Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 184. Cohen and Landis
were never close.
1

131

8

Securities Act of 1933 (House Report 152, 73d Cong., 1st. sess.,
1933), pp. 1-29.
9
Parrish, Securities Regulation, pp. 116-117.
10
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 456-7. See also Parrish,
Securities Legislation, pp. 121-2.
11
Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 164.
12
Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 464.
13
Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, p. 181n.
14
Quoted in Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, pp. 169-70.
15
Cohen to Robert E. Healy, 23 November 1934, quoted in
Parrish, Securities Regulation, p. 156.
16
Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 197.
17
Benjamin V. Cohen to Felix Frankfurter, 20 March 1936, Cohen
papers, LC.
18
Electric Bond and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
19
FDR to Benjamin Victor Cohen, 13 January 1945, FDR Papers,
President's Secretary's File, Box 140, Roosevelt Library. Cohen
was ultimately appointed Counselor to the State Department
under President Harry Truman and Secretary of State James F.
Byrnes.
2
°Charles Burlingham to Benjamin V. Cohen, 22 November
1944, Charles Burlingham Papers, Box 2, Folder 19, Harvard Law
School; Francis Biddle to FDR, 27 December 1944, FDR Papers,
Official File #51-5, Roosevelt Library.
21
The Corcoran Papers, housed at the Library of Congress,
comprise over 600 boxes of material.
22
The Cohen papers are also in the Library of Congress. Additional material is housed in the National Archives. Because
Cohen generally did not save copies of outgoing correspondence,
many of his own letters can be found only in the papers of his
correspondents.
23
Joseph Rauh, quoted in Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 465.
24
Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 465.
25
Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 466.

132

